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1. Introduction 
Investment treaties, and possibly the EU Treaty itself, are being used by multinational companies Penta and 
Eureko to try and force the Slovak government to pay compensation for reversing health privatisation and 
liberalisation policies. Similar action has been used against the Polish government by Eureko to win 
compensation worth nearly €2 billion Euros and a policy commitment to further privatisation. 
2. EC and investment treaty challenges to Slovakia health policies 
Private health insurance schemes were first introduced in Slovakia in 2004. A number of private companies 
set up to take advantage of this new market. In 2007, a new government changed the law to reduce the role 
of the private sector. Part of this law states that health insurance companies can only use their profits to 
reinvest in the health insurance business.  
 
Slovakia is now facing three legal challenges to this: 
- The European Commission has started to investigate if this breaches the fundamental principle of the 
free movement of capital within the EU;   
- Penta, the private equity company which owns two of these insurance companies, is taking a case to 
arbitration to claim compensation for lost profits, under an investment treaty with the Netherlands;  
- and private companies are also challenging the law as unconstitutional.  
 
The 2004 legislation and its consequences were summarised by a Slovak lawyer (see Annexe 1 for full text, including 
an interesting commentary on the state’s response to the legal challenge): 
“the Health Insurance Companies Law No. 581/2004 enabled that health insurance companies were created as 
business entities – join-stock companies. The insurance market was made accessible to private capital and the 
insurance companies were allowed to pay off their profits in form of dividends which is typical for the private 
sector with competition... The objective of the legislator in 2007 was to re-establish the original character of 
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 Thanks to Scott Sinclair for telling me about this case. 
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the health insurance, this intervention changed the character of the health insurance companies´ operation and 
in principle, they became non-profitable corporations. 
 
It terms of the communitarian law, a member state may shape the system of its public health insurance 
autonomously. It may or may not include elements of competition into the system, it may combine competition 
and non-competition rules. However, a problem occurs when elements with impact on the private capital are 
introduced and subsequently, there is a will to remove such elements. It is not possible to do is without a 
negative impact on investors and it is very difficult to choose tools which are adequate to the purpose and aim. 
In essence, the intention was good as its purpose was to secure that the public funds paid by people to the 
insurance companies compulsory continue to serve for the benefit of people and not for the benefit of private 
persons. However, even such altruistic aim must be achieved in such a way that the rights acquired in good 
faith and the legal relations established in accordance with valid laws are affected as little as possible.” 
 
The potential problems of increased costs, reduced equity, and difficulties in regulating the companies due to 
the effects of EU laws, were also recognised by an OECD paper, which warned –correctly - that:  
 
“the government must be careful to adjust its own expectations, and that of the public, to the actual 
potential it may fill. High expectations may lead to disappointment, particularly when there is cultural 
unfamiliarity with such markets. In addition, the complexity of the market and insurer activities may lead 
to confusion and dissatisfaction. It is therefore important that the government develops mechanisms to 
monitor the market, and that it has the administrative flexibility to intervene and attempt to correct 
problems, within the framework of permitted EU law.”  [OECD Health Working Papers NO. 
11DELSA/ELSA/WD/HEA(2004)2 The Slovak Health Insurance System And The Potential Role For 
Private Health Insurance: Policy Challenges.  Francesca Colombo and Nicole Tapay   05-Mar-2004 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/48/29878719.pdf ] 
 
3. The companies 
3.1. Penta-HICEE-Dovera-Apollo 
The compensation claim is being made by companies owned by the Penta Group.  
The compensation is being claimed by a Dutch company HICEE which is owned by Penta Group. 
The claim is for the impact on two Slovakian private health insurance companies, Dôvera  ( 
http://www.dovera.sk/ ) and Apollo  http://www.apollo.sk/sk/ , which are owned by HICEE .   
 
The action under the investment treaty is being pursued by http://www.hicee.nl/index.php  
 
Hicee, being a part of the PENTA International Investment Group is focused on healthcare business in 
Central and Eastern Europe. HICEE has no operating subsidiaries except its shares in the two Slovak 
operating companies. Its presentation of its organisation lists only these companies: “HICEE holds, through 
its wholly owned subsidiary DÔVERA Holding, a.s., 100% of shares in the Dôvera health insurance 
company and 49% of shares in the Apollo health insurance company. Hicee has developed a business plan 
which deals in detail with further growth of investments in [former public] private held healthcare companies 
and the enhancement of the European knowledge team providing consulting services related to healthcare.” 
http://www.hicee.nl/organisatie.html ; http://www.hicee.nl/nieuws.html?tx_news_pi1%5BshowUid%5D=16 
 
The private health insurers Dovera and Apollo are also planning to merge in 2010, in response to Slovak 
government encouragement of mergers of health insurers. The resulting insurance company will have about 
1.4mn clients. 
3.1.1. Penta Group 
Penta is a private equity group, investing in a number of different sectors, but with a number of investments 
in healthcare in the Czech and Slovak republic.  
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Penta founder Jaroslav Haščák knows that not everybody is going to be happy with what his firm does, 
unless, he says, Penta "buys a bakery and starts baking buns". poto: TASR  
The Slovak Spectator  30 Jul 2001 Penta Group's Haščák: Slovakia's corporate raider takes no prisoners 
http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/910 
 
Another investment by Penta was in SmVaK, the water company in Ostrava in the Czech Republic. It was 
already privatised, owned partly by Suez and partly by Anglian Water, from whom Penta bought the 
company in 2003-04 for €128m.. “At the time of acquisition, SmVaK had no debt”, but Penta took out a 
Euro €70m. bank loan which created a debt to assets ratio of 30:1; it then extracted a dividend of Euro €90 
million from SmVAK; it then repaid the original loan by issuing €80million of 10-year bonds at %5 fixed 
interest. In 2006 it then sold the company to FCC for €190m.  Penta’s total profit from the dividends and the 
sale were a profit of €175m. in 2 years.  
http://www.pentainvestments.com/uploads/tx_msprojects/Case_study_SmVaK.pdf ; 
http://www.pentainvestments.com/investments.html 
 
It has been suggested in Poland that Penta has concealed Russian connections and has links with former 
Czech communist secret service personnel:  
“The Czech-Slovak investment group Penta is suspected in Poland of cooperation with Russian secret services 
and of having capital of an unclear and opaque origin, the Czech daily Lidove noviny (LN) writes today, citing 
Polish minister Aleksander Szczyglo. Szczyglo, head of the National Security Office, voiced the suspicion in 
connection with the privatisation of the Polish helicopter producer, PZL Swidnik, LN writes. He also 
challenged as "a very strange thing" the widely-known participation of General Alojz Lorenc, former head of 
the then communist Czechoslovak secret service (StB), in Penta's structures. "The Polish secret services are 
automatically obliged to monitor the privatisation involving strategic companies," LN quotes Szczyglo as 
saying. (CTK National Czech-Slovak investment group suspected of links to Kremlin-press CTK National 
News Wire Wednesday, August 26 2009 http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-
offices-government/12751083-1.html ) 
 
3.2. Eureko-Union 
Eureko is a Dutch company investing in health and life insurance and pensions. Following the merger (in 
2005) between its Dutch operation, Achmea, and Interpolis, the insurance subsidiary of Rabobank,, its main 
shareholders are Achmea with 54,37 % of the ordinary shares and Rabobank with 39,47 %. With operations 
in eleven countries, the Eureko Group has more than 25.000 employees  It has expanded through a long 
string of acquisitions, including Greek insurer Interamerican.  It also owns 33% of Polish health insurance 
company PZU (see below) 
 
The Netherlands, 
Luxembourg 
Achmea  
Belgium Avero Belgium 
Greece  Interamerican Greece 
Ireland  Friends First Ireland 
Slovakia Union Slovakia 
France  Imperio France 
Romania Eureko Romania 
 Bulgaria Interamerican Bulgaria 
Turkey Eureko Sigorta 
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Cyprus  Interlife Cyprus 
Russia Oranta 
 
http://www.eurekosigorta.com/En/DisplayContents.asp?ContentId=56 
http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/101/101523.html 
 
3.3. The European Commission action 
In November 2009 the EC Commissioner for Internal market and Services launched an action on this issue 
because the restriction on use of profits may conflict with the EU principle of free movement of capital. It 
wrote to the Slovakian government asking for a response within 2 months. A spokesman for the EC was 
quoted as saying: "It seems that the imposition of an absolute prohibition on privately owned public health 
insurance providers from using their profits other than for the provision of public health care in the Slovak 
Republic, constitutes an unjustified restriction on the freedom of capital movements". This action was taken 
following a complaint made to the EC in 2008 – presumably by the same companies bringing the action 
under the investment treaty.  (Reuters 20 November 2009 EU probes Slovakia's action against health insurers 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLK686591).   
Other press reports state that the EC has also queried another Slovak rule: “that insurers which enter 
liquidation or otherwise leave the market must transfer their clients, without charge, to another health 
insurer” , again based on a complaint by a Dutch company which owns Union, another private health insurer 
operating in Slovakia. (The Slovak Spectator 30 Nov 2009 EC challenges Slovakia over insurers' profit ban. 
http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/37243/3/ec_challenges_slovakia_over_insurers_profit_ban.html ) 
3.4. The investment treaty: Netherlands-Czechoslovakia treaty 1991 
The claim by Penta and Eureko is brought not under EU law but under the provisions of an investment treaty 
signed in 1991 between the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia.  Czechoslovakia no longer exists, but the treaty 
was inherited by both the Czech republic and Slovakia. It was signed less than 2 years after the country had 
escaped from the old communist regime, through the ‘Velvet Revolution’, and 13 years before the two 
countries became full member states of the EU, alongside the Netherlands.  
 
(Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Treaty number 011207 Date of conclusion 29 April 
1991 Place of conclusion Praag Entry into force 1 October 1992. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
treaty database http://www.minbuza.nl/en/Key_Topics/Treaties/Search_the_Treaty_Database?isn=011207 , 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0003005/geldigheidsdatum_15-12-2009.) 
 
The arbitration is being conducted through the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNICITRAL rules. 
Members of the tribunal have been appointed. HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1334 . 
 
4. Similar cases 
4.1. Eureko wins €1.8 billion compensation from Poland for non-privatisation of PZU 
Eureko owns 33% of  PZU, which operates a large part of  the public health insurance and pension system in 
Poland, including managing pension funds and providing other financial services. It was 100% state owned 
until 1999, when the government agreed to sell 30% to Eureko. In 2001 the government planned to float the 
company on the stock exchange, in the course of which Eureko expected to obtain a further 21% of shares 
and so gain majority control. This flotation was cancelled, however, and subsequent governments refused to 
sell more shares to Eureko.  Eureko claimed compensation through arbitration under the  Netherlands-Poland 
investment protection treaty: “This allowed Eureko to get around a clause in the privatisation deal 
committing the two sides to adjudicate any disputes in Polish courts.” (Reuters 17/01/2008 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL174991720080117 ) Eureko won arbitration awards in 2005, and again 
in 2007. In October 2009, to settle the dispute, the Polish government agreed a deal under which PZU paid a 
special dividend worth  €1.85billion to Eureko. The Polish currency, the zloty, was affected by concerns that 
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Eureko would immediately convert its dividen into Euros, and also that PZU might sell Polish government 
bonds to finance the special dividend. The settlement also commits Poland to privatisation by flotation of 
PZU, before 2012 (although Eureko can force a postponement “if market circumstances are adverse”) and 
guarantees payments to Eureoko if there is no flotation by this date 
(http://www.eureko.net/sites/default/files/2009-10-02_presentation.pdf ). 
 
The state still owns 55% of PZU at the end of 2009. It is the biggest private health insurance company in 
central and eastern Europe, with large profits and assets of €16 billion. Because of the dispute it has not 
expanded much into other central European countries, but is now planning to invest €3billion in expanding 
abroad, especially into Ukraine and Russia: it hosted a 2-day conference on the subject in November 2009.1 
 
 
4.2. Previous case: double proceedings against Czech republic 
A previous case against the Czech republic highlighted the potential for multiple proceedings by companies 
registered in one country with owners registered in another.  CME Czech Republic B.V., a Netherlands-
registered company which lost a TV broadcasting license in the Czech republic, claimed compensation on 
the grounds that a Czech law restricting foreign ownership of media companies was in breach of the 
Netherlands-Czechoslovakia investment treaty. The case went to arbitration under UNICITRAL, in Sweden: 
and the company won.  At the same time, a major shareholder in CME, an American named Ronald S. 
Lauder, also brought proceedings on the grounds that it breached a USA-Czechoslovakia investment treaty. 
This also went to arbitration under UNICITRAL, with a different panel, in London – which ruled in favour 
of the Czech republic. The two decisions came within 10 days of each other. The discussion of this ‘double 
jeopardy’ is now attached to the Netherlands-Czechoslovak treaty. (see annexe 2)  
   
 (IRIS 2001-10:2/1 UNCITRAL International Courts of Arbitration: Awards in TV Nova Case. Awards of 
the UNCITRAL Courts of Arbitration in London and Stockholm, 3 and 13 September 2001 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2001/10/article1.en.html ) 
 
 
Annexe 1. Legal commentary by Slovak lawyer July 2009 
 
MARTINKOVÁ: Amendment to the Health Insurance Companies Law has weak points (tvnoviny.sk) 
Date: 28.07.2009 14:06 Author: PALU Category: Public Health 
http://www.advocatus-law.eu/article-legislature?language=en 
  
Bratislava, July 28th (TASR) – TASR was talking with the attorney Jana Martinková about amendment to the Health 
Insurance Companies Law, lawsuits entered by the health insurance companies, arbitrations, defence of the Slovak 
Republic. 
What were the objectives of the controversial amendment to the Health Insurance Companies Law and what 
were the intended advantages?  
 
In terms of the constitutional right of each individual to health protection, the state is obliged to adopt such legal 
regulations that would ensure free health care for its citizens through health insurance companies. In my opinion, the 
intention of the legislator was good and in accordance with the social direction of our country which our citizens have 
chosen in the elections. 
 
The Slovak health insurance system is a system of public compulsory social health insurance created on the principle of 
solidarity. In such environment, the Health Insurance Companies Law No. 581/2004 enabled that health insurance 
companies were created as business entities – join-stock companies. The insurance market was made accessible to 
private capital and the insurance companies were allowed to pay off their profits in form of dividends which is typical 
for the private sector with competition... The objective of the legislator in 2007 was to re-establish the original character 
of the health insurance, this intervention changed the character of the health insurance companies´ operation and in 
principle, they became non-profitable corporations. 
 
It terms of the communitarian law, a member state may shape the system of its public health insurance autonomously. It 
may or may not include elements of competition into the system, it may combine competition and non-competition 
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rules. However, a problem occurs when elements with impact on the private capital are introduced and subsequently, 
there is a will to remove such elements. It is not possible to do is without a negative impact on investors and it is very 
difficult to choose tools which are adequate to the purpose and aim. In essence, the intention was good as its purpose 
was to secure that the public funds paid by people to the insurance companies compulsory continue to serve for the 
benefit of people and not for the benefit of private persons. However, even such altruistic aim must be achieved in such 
a way that the rights acquired in good faith and the legal relations established in accordance with valid laws are affected 
as little as possible. 
  
What are the weak points of the amendment and what problems has it caused? 
 
The weakest points of the amendment are the following: retroactivity – the Slovak Republic is a legal state, its attribute 
is a legal security, including the guarantee that the legislator will not adopt retroactive enactments that would withdraw 
rights acquired in good faith and in accordance with valid laws from legal entities – this amendment expressly interferes 
with the existing legal relations; non-observance of the principle of proportionality in sense of Article 13, section 4 
(when restricting the health insurance companies, their essence and sense must be taken into account) representing 
preservation of the equitable balance between the needs of the public (general) interests of society and protection of the 
lawful rights of individuals = the intervention into the health insurance companies must be appropriate, necessary and 
adequate – the state has the right to amend its legislation but it must always follow a lawful objective and to choose 
adequate means to achieve such objective; restriction of ownership rights without a compensation - the amendment 
removes lawful expectations of the health insurance companies for materialization of the values that have a character of 
property without paying the aggrieved entities real value of that part of investment they have been indirectly deprived of 
as a consequence of the amendment. 
  
What will be the arguments of the shareholders of the health insurance companies – claimants? 
 
The claimants, the shareholder of Dôvera and Apollo HICCE B.V. and the shareholder of UNION z.p. EUREKO B.V. 
will defend themselves against the legislative interference in an arbitration proceeding as some articles of the 
Investment Protection Agreement have been violated. On basis of that, the investors will claim compensations for 
deflated investments. These are defined in the above mentioned Agreement rather widely which will influence the 
amount of compensation in the event that the arbiters fail to adopt the argumentation of the Slovak Republic. The 
proceedings in respect of compliance of the controversial amendment with the Constitution will be indirectly supported 
by a motion filed by a group of MPs at the Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court finds out that the Law No. 
530/2007 and the law No. 594/2007 is not in compliance with the Constitution and international agreements, it will 
have an impact on the loss of effectiveness of the Law and indirectly, it will also influence the course of the arbitration. 
  
What will be the arguments of the state?  
 
The state will try to persuade the arbiters that the compensation claimed by shareholders of the health insurance 
companies is not justified as the health insurance companies (HIC) are not entrepreneurs and the purchase of the health 
care by the HIC is not an economic operation oriented to profit. For example, it will use the arguments that the HIC 
fulfil tasks in the public interest, that they are established for the purpose of performing the tasks of the state in fulfilling 
its social functions, that they may not carry out operations other than those specified by law, that they are not free to 
differentiate the amount of premiums (inputs), that the amount of premiums is precisely defined and may not be 
increased, decreased or waived, that the source of their funding (inputs) are insurance contributions having the character 
of an additional „tax“ (the perceptual rate and its base is fixed) through wage deductions and non-payment of such 
contributions is an offence, that the calculation of premium payers is fixed, that they have a contracting obligation set 
by law – the obligation to conclude contracts with providers in specified network of providers, that the insured are 
obliged to enter into a public health insurance contract with a health insurance company (beginning and end of the 
public heath insurance for the insured is ex lege, that the mechanism of redistribution applies to them etc. 
 
The Slovak health insurance system is a system of public compulsory social health insurance created on the principle of 
solidarity. The health insurance is a service in public interest with the aim to satisfy the rights of individuals and HIC 
are only mediators for the state in fulfilling its obligations towards its citizens, or administrations of public issues on 
basis of lawful authorization. Health insurance is not undertaking. although HIC are joint stock companies, it is mutual 
assistance. The competition between individual insurers is also rather limited as they may not influence the amount of 
inputs and outputs, they may compete among themselves only in application of their marketing strategies. They may use 
real competition only in private insurance. 
 
The principle of solidarity on which the public health insurance is based means that the health insurance is financed by 
constitutions that are proportional to income of the insured and the insured with very low income are exempted for 
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paying contributions... Solidarity means hat the income is redistributed among those who are better off in terms of both 
their financial situation and health condition and those who would be otherwise deprived of the health insurance 
coverage due to their financial situation and health condition - i.e. the healthy ones pay for the sick). 
 
The activity based on the principle of national solidarity justifies exclusion of the compulsory health insurance from 
competition and therefore, it should be non-profitable. 
 
Another reason for exclusion of the public health insurance from competition is the fact that in principle, HICs provide 
to their clients identical benefits the extend of which does not depend on the premium amount but arises from the Law 
No. 577/2004. The insurance companies have no possibility to influence either the amount of contributions or the 
extend of coverage to which the insured are entitled. Thus, they do not perform activities of an economic character, they 
are not subject to the rules of competition as other business companies and therefore, they may be regarded as 
enterprises according to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Agreement. 
  
Why do health insurance companies sue the Slovak Republic in an arbitration and not in any other proceedings, 
e.g. before an international court? 
 
The obligation to submit to the award of an arbitration court arises from the Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments concluded between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic in 1991 which was acceded by the Slovak Republic. According to this Agreement, each party has to 
appoint one arbiter who will then together appoint the presiding arbiter. It the event that they fail to agree about the 
person of the presiding arbiter, the presiding arbiter shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Arbitration Court of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm.  
 
The arbitration court compiled in this way shall be governed by the procedural rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The arbitration court shall take into account other factors including, but not 
limited to the valid law of the parties, provisions of the Agreement stated above, provisions of individual investment 
agreements and the general principles of international law. 
 
What we know about the course of the arbitration between the Slovak Republic and Dutch shareholder HICEE BV (a 
100% shareholder of Dôvera, a 49% shareholder of Apollo z.p.) is that by the notice of arbitration delivered to the 
Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister on December 22, 2008, the arbitration proceedings were commended, the 
counsel of the claimant is the American company Sidley Austin LLP (Washington). Both parties appointed an arbiter, 
(the claimant appointed Mr. Charles N. Brower and the responded appointed Mr. Peter Tomka) and both arbiters 
appointed the third arbiter, Sir Franklin Berman as the presiding arbiter. 
 
As a compensation for the damages caused by violation of the Agreement in connection with changes in legislation 
2006, 2007 (limitation on the disposal of positive economic result of health insurance providers and reduction of a cap 
on their operational expenses (Article 3, sections 2,4 and 5, Article 4, Article 5), the claimant claims from the Slovak 
Republic € 750 mil. 
  
What obligations arise for the Slovak Republic from the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments concluded between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic? 
 
Article 3 – to ensure full protection and security of investments of the contracting parties; to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment to the investments of investors of the other contracting party, without any unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures that might impair the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those 
investors; to accord to such investments full security and protection which in any case shall not be less than that 
accorded to investments of its own investors; to observe the obligations in relation to the investments of the other 
contracting party; preference of more favourable rules (from the system of law of the state or from an international 
contract) for a more convenient treatment of investments than are provided for by the Agreement; Article 4 - to 
guarantee transfers of payments ( profit, interests, dividends, amounts for purchase of row materials, development of 
investments.... the proceeds of sale or liquidation of the investment...) Article 5 - not to take any measures depriving, 
directly or indirectly, investors of the other contracting party of their investments unless the following conditions are 
complied with: the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; the measures are not 
discriminatory; the measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of just compensation representing the 
genuine value of the investments affected. 
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Has it been possible to avoid the arbitration, who is responsible for the faults of the state? 
 
In my purely personal opinion, the initial fault occurred in 2004 when the legislative changes in the area of health 
insurance and health insurance companies partly introduced market elements into this sector and space for private 
investments participation was opened. The legislator tried to change this situation in 2007, though not very luckily. Of 
course, it is much more difficult to find a solution when you want to introduce public elements into the sector with 
„private capital“, or when you want to replace „the market“ system by a non-market one. From this point of view, the 
situation was simpler for the legislator in 2004. To change the set rules of game now and not to impair the investor is a 
task for Solomon, but it is not impossible. In any case, it is not possible to deprive an investor, directly or indirectly, of 
his investments without paying him an equitable compensation. 
  
The Ministry of Finance addressed several law companies in an effort to find a counsel in this dispute. In this 
connection, the companies Teynier Pic & Associés, KŠD Štovíček, Konečná & Šafář, s.r.o., Winston & Straw and 
the law office of David A. Pawlak have been mentioned. Do you know them?  
 
The name of the first company reminded me of the investment arbitration proceedings held in the years 2004-2007 by 
the Dutch investor Eastern Sugar B.V. who was represented by Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom versus the Czech 
Republic, The investor claimed violation of the same Agreement on protection of investments. The Czech Republic, 
represented by Eric Teynier from the French company Teynier Pic & Associés was not successful. Therefore, this 
choice surprises me a bit. 
 
Winston & Strawn is a large American company but in the worldwide law firms ranking, it does not belong even to the 
top thirty. It is difficult to say what range of expertise the above mentioned law firms may provide in arbitration 
lawsuits as the reliable accessible worldwide statistics (Chambers & Partners) deal only with the 25 most successful law 
offices and the selected four ones are not among them. 
  
What is your opinion about the law office that will represent the shareholder of the health insurance companies 
Dôvera and Apollo (HICEE B.V.)? 
 
The American company Sidley Austin belongs both by its size (7th in the worldwide ranking) and success to the top 
law offices in the world and only a narrow range of law offices may compete with it with regard to the their wide 
experience in similar disputes. Therefore, the main criterion for the Slovak Republic in selecting its counsel should be 
the fact that the legal representation of the state has at least equally strong position in the worldwide ranking of law 
offices, supported of course by the range of experience and percentage of success.  
  
How long have you been dealing with these problems? 
 
For more than a year. The main impulse for that is my inner belief that as far as the public funds collected from the 
insured in form of contributions within the public health insurance may represent a potential for securing the right of 
citizens for free health care and medical devices guaranteed by the constitution, the legislator should take such 
legislative measures that would guarantee such constitutional rights. When preparing the standpoints for the 
international law firms that have showed their interest to represent the Slovak Republic in this dispute, I was led by this 
idea, as well as by the prospect of success.  
  
Can you reveal the names of these companies? 
 
They are law firms belonging to the top five in the world (The List: Top Law Firms 2008). One of them was the 
American company Baker & McKenzie, but the cooperation with this firm was quitted when the had been ascertained 
that the company had conflict of interest. Simultaneously, the cooperation with the company Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom (Europe) LLP. was developing. 
  
Why do you cooperate in particular with this company? 
 
One of the reasons is also the fact that this company lost none of approximately 50 investment arbitrations in which it 
provided legal services.  
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Does selection of a law firm for the state require a public tender? 
 
The Public Procurement Law relates to the activities (orders) listed in Annexes to the Law and for which a contract is 
concluded. Law services belong to the non-priority services listed in Annex No. 3 to the Law (No. 25/2006 Z.z.) In 
selecting law services, the procedure depends on the expected value of the order. If the value is equal or higher than € 
6,000,000.00, the procedure of placing under-limit orders apply, if the value is lower than € 6,000,000.00, the procedure 
of placing under-threshold orders apply, i.e. in each case, the provisions of the Public Procurement Law shall apply, in 
particular its basic principles: the principle of equal treatment, non-discrimination of applicants, transparency, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
In terms of the European legislation, the procedure in placing public orders for services, including legal services is 
regulated by the Directive 2004/18/EC which relates to provision of services in the area of legal counselling under the 
condition that the value of the order exceeds € 249,000.00. Similarly, also arbitration disputes and settlement 
proceedings are exempted provided that the selection relates to the person of an arbiter. It sets out an obligation to the 
procurer to treat all participants of the public competition non-discriminatory and transparently. Obviously, the 
Directive stated above was not implemented into the Public Procurement Law correctly. Also the ESD judicature (e.g. 
the Judgement C-231/03 Rn 21), as well as the reports of the Commission 2006/C 179/02 stated in agreement that in the 
inter-market tasks, “the company with its registered office in another member state must have access to adequate 
information about an order before it is placed so that it may show its interest to get the order”. Therefore, publication of 
a sufficiently accessible notice is essential and the following criterion applies: the more interesting the order is for 
potential applicants from other member states, the wider it should be communicated. A formal invitation for tenders is 
not necessary, it is enough to describe individual items of the order and the placement procedure briefly, observing the 
following principles: non-discriminatory description of the subject of order – an equal access for applicants from all 
member states; a transparent and objective formulation. I don’t know how the Ministry of Finance made this order for 
providing legal services public but if it published it only on its website, although it was in accordance with the Public 
Procurement Law, the EU Directive which should have been and was implemented in the Public Procurement Law 
might have been thereby violated. 
  
Has the law been violated?  
 
I can’t answer this question because I don’t have enough information how the Ministry of Finance actually proceeded in 
this matter, which basis the Public Procurement Authority used and I don’t know the reasons for its decision. I can’t use 
the information published in media as their extend is insufficient for a legal standpoint and moreover, I don’t follow all 
medial sources. 
  
What is your opinion about the statement of the MF spokesman according to which: „According to §1, section 2, 
subsection i) of the Public Procurement Law No. 25/206 Z.z., the obligations arising from this Law do not apply 
to arbitration proceedings“. These were his reasons why the selection of a law firm is not subject to the Public 
Procurement Law. 
 
If this is actually the opinion of the Ministry of Finance, then it is clearly an incorrect and unprofessional interpretation 
of the above stated provision. It is true that the Public Procurement Law does not apply to arbitration proceedings, but 
an order for the legal services listed in Annex No. 3 and provided by counsels or law firms does not represent an 
exemption from the Law. The exemption relates to selection of an arbiter who may be a counsel but who, within in an 
arbitration proceedings, provides services other than those provided by law offices, i.e. an arbiter is not a counsel, he 
does not represent the Slovak Republic in the proceedings. An arbiter has the status of a judge. That is why the 
exemption stated above is mentioned. Such interpretation is expressly supported also by the EU Directive 2004/18/EC, 
by the Report of the European Commission 2006/C 179/02 and last but not least, by the ESD judicature. 
  
So what is your opinion about the published statement of the Public Procurement Authority according to which 
“within arbitration proceedings, specific services are provided by institutions selected in the manner to which the 
rules for placing orders specified in the Public Procurement Law cannot be applied“? 
 
This formulation seems to me very vague. The Public Procurement Authority should specify the services it has in mind 
and what institutions provide such specific services. As far as I know, in an arbitration proceeding, the same legal 
services are provided as in an a lawsuit and only counsels or law firms are authorised to provide such services. 
Therefore, I think that this must be an misunderstanding between the journalist and the authority stated above because 
this statement may be an answer to the question about selection of an arbiter in the arbitration proceedings. 
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In October 2008, a group of MPs filed a motion at the Constitutional Court demanding that the provisions 
„prohibiting profits“ to HICs are declared not to be in compliance with the Constitution. What decision do you 
expect? 
 
Due to the fact that after receiving a proposal for further proceedings on February 25, 2009, the Constitutional Court has 
not suspend the effectiveness of the contested provisions, it is probably not persuaded that continued application of 
these provisions in practice may jeopardize basic rights and freedoms or human rights and basic freedoms arising from 
international contracts, or that their application would result in a massive economic loss or any other severe and 
irreparable consequence. 
 
In the event that according to the findings of the Constitutional Court, the contested provisions are in conflict with the 
Constitution, with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and additional 
Protocol ), the Constitutional Court will suspend its effectiveness and the legislator will have the term of 6 months to 
amend the valid legislation so that it would be in accordance with the Constitutional Court findings. 
  
When you know which mistakes have been made in amending the health insurance companies law, do you also 
know how should the legislator proceed to avoid them? 
 
Of course, we have been dealing with these problems long enough to be able to offer a solution which would take into 
account the intended objective, but with minimum interventions into the rights of investors. 
 What legislative solution have you in mind?  
 
The amendment to Health Insurance Companies Law is not the only nor the most important one. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Sources include: 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=2159401; 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1201113121.88/ ; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2662202020080626 ; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWAR01096420091002 ; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL174991720080117  ; http://www.eureko.net/press/eureko/235  
http://www.eureko.net/press/eureko/236 ; http://www.eureko.net/sites/default/files/2009-10-02.pdf ; 
http://www.eureko.net/sites/default/files/2009-10-02_presentation.pdf ; 
http://www.genevaassociation.org/Program/WarsawProgramme.pdf ; 
http://www.cabrnoch.cz/media/Program_AN.pdf . 
 
